The Death of Private Corporations Having Capital Stock by Nall, George A.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
1892




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Law Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nall, George A., "The Death of Private Corporations Having Capital Stock" (1892). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection. Paper
267.
T, I F 1 9 I S.
TUB, DIgATII O PRIVATE (ORPORATIONS HAVING CAPITAL 9TOCK.
- Ny-
/
Gi )RGi A. INALL.




In cons.ider ing tTYe causes of the Death of Privs, Cor-
porationi. and the effect of iuch death, it has not been my
ail to collect innumerable cases and decisions, but to set
forth the general principles underlying this branch of corpor-
ation law ; wid to reduce to a logical basis the theory de-
duced from the decisions of the various courts, which theory
has, hitherto, been in much conffusion and obscurity. The
sole object. has been t.o clear away the clouds and mists which
overhang and obscure the time nature of this interesting sub-
jet.
G. A. 1.
C 0 1 TE B N T S.
PAW I.
PART I!.
Causes of the Death of a Private
Corporation .................... 0
1. Voluntary Death ............
2. Involunt.ary Death ..........
The Effect of the Death of a
Private Corporation ............
1. The Rights and Liabilities
of the Corporation.............
2. The Rights and Liabilities
of the Stockholders .......... .









TilE DEATIH OF PRIVATE CORPOUATIOIS HAVING CAPITAL STOCK.
PART I.
Gauses of the Death of a Private Corporation.
Concerning this brancb of corporation lav there i , much
confusion in the .. ,es and text books, fro,,- the tf.h ,
distinction betweon the dissolution of a corporaiio:, and i'03
death is not, Trictly ob}erved. i)issouiji s us .- i 1 4,0o
distinct, sense% :--
1. It is applied to tbe actual toirr:- ,tiol of tbt, cor-
porate existence, or the extinguishment of its franchlso of
being a corporation ; and
;:. it. , applied wner'e the corporation, by act of its
sharo'holdol " , or directors, suspends business arnd sells ;-ll
its property, but .ithout -i s franchi-e of cor-
porate life.
Where the death of a corporation is spoken of, it moanr
the, actual termination of the corportto !ife or ff'a.nbe of
beintgr. Since a corporation can be created only by "operation
of law', its existence can be terini ted only by "operation of
lav.' Dissolution, therefore, is a broader teri-n than duath ,-
the two being' synonymous only in one sense.
A corpor'ation that is dissolved without its fr,'nchisu of
existence being terninated is dormant, and not dead. nence,
the corporation may be dissolved -(L facto bofore it. is dP jfl-
Ia. Thus, whoro all the shareholders of a corporation, by
unanimous agreement, should vind up the company's business al,1
disband the organization before the time limited in the chai-
ter had expired, the association would no !on.ei exist as a
matter of fact ; yet the courts would still consider the co'-
poration in existence as a matter of law. (IRtial!_ v. iaMD-
lan, 14 Pick. (3k-; ; nowlon. v. Arjjy., 8 Gush. 9b.)
iut wbere a corporal'*,ion i- dissolved de- jr before it is
.ln facto, p.u -.liar conditions ari3o. Leavi-L' aside the right
ton colnirui businesq aftor j death for the purpose of
- c -onsiderL , , , ~h
seC+ling ,,, co.po (.tuse, aofaa-, v e h
the corporate life has boen termiret.ed by act, of lau 'and the
continuing of businesi operation being without attempt, to
'wind up' the affairs, it is found that the comron law pro-
hibited such continuance, and the validit.y of acts L'JL tran-
sactions tnder such circumstances would be affecteo by t,},2s
prohibition. Such power as that, of conderniirqir, propeity for
tho construction of a railroad, or a ferry, could not, be ex-
ercised by a corporation (if such it be) in th.tt condition.
(lark J ~ Brook 1. j L. , 72 1. Y. 24C ; 7, 1,. Y. 33;57. : Y.a, (j, . .
81 14. Y. e- ; D . La.v. Q Bvoo , 78 1. Y.
Though, if the existence of such a corporation is an im-
mutable fact, the courts c not reasonably ignor it. ; nor
would acts and dealings wit.h such a corporation nece qarily be
ineffective and its contracts of no binding force, for the
doctrines of estoppel would apply, and tho question whether
the charter has expired or been extinguished is a question
which carmot be inquired into collaterally in any proceeding
but must be adjudictted in a direct, proceeding instituted by
the State for +hat purpose. Lu,.. ou iht G v. .,
TjoQlia, I1 IMo. App. Brb ~ - v; Q&U fy. L ata Caa i
18-7 Mlas. 71. )
The different ways in which the death of :i co- poradtion i,
effected,-- that, is, the actual extinuishnmnt of the fin-
1.1
chise of existence,-- as generally given in the text books may
he classified as follows :--
1 . Death by operation of statuto ; either by exiration
of charter, or by legislative enactment, provided no consti-
tu tional provision be violated.
2. Death by winding up and surrender of the franchise of
life with tP. consent of the Sta,o.
. Death by forfeiture of franchises and judgmont ob-
tained in a proper judicial proceeding ; and
,i:. Death by "failure of an esgential p- -t" of te cor-
porate orgfanization, provided it cannot be restor.d.
This forth division is cloarly the result of a confu-
si.on of what really constitutes the death of a corporation aid
its dissolution. The great case given in support of this
proposition is the case of Piips v. W (I Paige, , -7),
where reference is made to the case in Rolle's Abridgement.
Chancellor Walviorth said : "f a corporation consists of sev-
eral integral parts, and o(mne of those parts are g/:one and the
remaining parts have no power to .ipply the deficiency, the
corporation is dissolved. As in the case in Rolle (I Rolle
Abr. 574, !) where the corporation was to be composed of a
certain nmunber of brothers ,,nd a ceirtain nunber of si ters,
and a!! the sisters were dead, and it was admitted that all
the acts done by the brothers afterwards were void ; for,
after the sisters were dead, it was not a perfect corporation.
But the case vhich is immediately afterwards stated by Rol lo
shows that if f,ho brothers had possessed the power to appoint
other sisters in the place of those who were dead the corpor-
ation rnis'ht bav been revived." The quostion of dissolution
is a question of law, and the consmideration of de in.  ,s
case was not that the legal existence of ,.be corporation had
been extinguished, but .hat circuirstances had transpired which
prevented the operation of the functions of t.he corporation.
IPs franchise of being was still in existonce.
The rule s+,ated by Chance!]or Walworth was first applied
to those org:nizations which ordinarily cm-sisted of several
distinct part-s and which could be perpetuated only by pre-
scribed methods --- municipal and ecclesiastical corporations.
The rule, however, is not applicable to stock companie.; , with
their transferable shares and their officers and ,ioents ap-
pointed by vote of the shareholders. Stuch officers and agents,
though necessary for the management of tbe company, are not,
eqisential to its franchise of existence, nor do they form an
integral part of it. The shareholders may, by a duly called
mootinl, again olect officeers and resire business. (l v.
iz, 2 3 Watts, LL,, ; Comonlyeahh. v. Gil an, 13 Pa.
St. 188 ; 2 Morawetz's Priv .te Corporations, Sec. 1008.)
At tua early day it vas 13old that if _ll ,ho mobcr, of a
3,rporation should die, the corportion was necesarily dis-
solved. [IL-. Kyd (2 Kyd on Cocporations, 447-d) that it
is a 'proposition so plain that, it, seems ludicrous to mention
it,.' The marr ,,;tion iy have b 3cn dissolved but it is not
dead in lav!. 7,iis rule is still appliod to clubs and socie-
ties whoso members must Le olected by voto of the existing
members. But in the case of corporations whoe I.uombership
is repr2.sent.od by shues of stock the rule doe- not apiyl .
Such a corporation can never bua without ,-mbo,,-,-. for the
shareg of the several members pass by asoignunt, bequest or
descent, and they must ever belole.; to some person, J!ho, for
the time, will be considered one of the corporate members.
(Boston Glss, J. l, v. Tg , 24 Pick. 52 ; &=11 v.
o (,e Pican,. 99.) Therefore the decease of all -,.he
shareholders does not torminato its existence ; nor does the
fact that, all the shar'es are held by a nndividual. if
such sole owner continues the businoss undei , the .orporate
name without notice to the public, he may still be sued as a
corporation.~~ ,9m r._ v. h rito t .4corpor~~~tion. ....a aj Dj V - a. 148.)
etiu-ning now to the claiiification of the different, ways,
in whioh a corporation may bo dissolved, and recognizing the
pr'inciple that the franchise of existence Imust be actually ex-
tinguished, the subject naturally divides itself into : (1)
death voluntary ; and (2) death involuntary. fly yalwitinL
death is meant the termination of existence by the act of the
members of t.bo corporation themselves without any interference
on ,,e pit, of fho St.te. This comprises te 'surrender' of
the old clagsification. By inol=1al'y d is meant the
o.xtinct.ion of life by sone external means --- by judgrtent of
forfeit,iure, limitation of charter or legislative enactmont.
The 'faiiure of an essential pt%' under the old classifica-
tion, ai we have soon, is erroneous and consequently has no
p.Iaoo in this classiification.
1. Voluntary Death.
The rule has become well settled in this country that a
corporation may be dissolved by a surrender of its corporate
rights and franchises. (Pn Boom v. kamon, 16 14e.
2 24 ; Enfield 1, IL. fD, v. On , ai&. , 7 Oonn. 29, ; ;
iiJciv. &, I Paige, 0 1 , 107. ) 7hough this can-
not, bo Offotod by the officers of (,he oorporation without the
assont of the groat body of the sooioty. (onal
T v. _Onondal a l , 7 im, b4-9.) It is essential to
a valid di4soliution that tho surrender be accepted by tho
State granting the franchise. And this acceptance is ordi-
narily malnifested only by act of the legislature. (Wilson v.
PregriQogr. , D , 9 F. I. 590 ; M j,., l p, v.
Ta 24 Pick. 49.)
There are indications of some difficult;, in deteormining
whether or not a majority of the stockholdors can dissolvo the
corporation, thouph upon principle it dould seem reasonable
that thoy corld do so. The will of the majoritj rules the
corporation in every other case, yet some wvould make this an
exception, though not without good reason. They hold that a
tyraxrtical majority ought riot to be able to diasolve the cor-
poration to the prejudice of t0he minority. Though, on the
contrary, the majority may deem a business unprofitable, it,
viould be equally ujust to allow an obstinate minority to work
haam to so lar";ge an interest in the corporation. The rule,
however, is tuquestioned that all the stockholders may by tuilii-
moud consent, effect, a dissolution by a surlender of its fran-
chliso. (fle,1ccg.0-V. 14x's L 0 . 80 14. Y. 59LD 0 t3u
v. Tuna, 12 Him, Mtil.) VTi~e tho l'aw is ursottiled
in some of tho 9tates, there are precedents at, leasnt in MJas-
sachusetts and Pennsylvania. In tho case of 2rdvi1 v.
Sa~i-abm:S4;. Co (7 (Way, 405), it was tbe opinion of t.he
court that there was "no doubt of the right, of a corporation
* . . . by a vote of a majority of their stockholders to
wind up their -ffairs and close tip their business, if in the
exercisqe of a sound discretion they doem it expedient so to
do.' And in fr case of W v. 1 (44 Pa. St. 535),
it was held tViat a majority of the stockholders of a corpora-
tion have -,)ower to dissolve it. And the holding of a coturt
in t0hode Island vias that tho dissent, of one stockholder should
not be allowed to provent a surrender desired by all the other
members of !., e oompany. (e v. Pop-ia --s:, et., 9 h.
590.)
Afler a long continued non-user, it- may be presumed that
a corporation has surrendered its franchise to the -ak. 11,
the mere fact that a corporation has been k;ithout officers or
organization, and has performed no corporate act for a number
og years, does not teominaie it, oo,,ist,ence, althouw,,h there ma.
be good grotuid for declauring its franchise forfeited by ju-
dcial proceedings. (Ban o V. £r .aa., 24 Vt.
824 ;s a v. a uniraitlvo, 5 Ind. 777 ; RassJi vo
, i,!. PiAK. ,63 ; jag;j. v. M'ay, ',;o Me. 1.o.)
A Srarender may be implied fro.-i acts sufforod by a Cor-
poration to be done, which des. roy th. ond and objocts for
which it v'as creatod. ( v. Blom, 1t) Johns. L(.j ;
v. n .Qi idudanoi, 6 Cowen, 21'7 ; L-ogr v. Vhijwom 4-6) Mo.
Sixickland ~ ~ v.,,tl~ '; ,.,= ;wal v. 21UMAL, 12
J ;, . ) 5 "J'4  in te case of 1 v. Ai tcom (supra)
i, vta,; held wh,.t ere thw. vi wa, a neizurf: aMd sale of a rail-
road undo'. ,ber th ,,ate ien, the railroad covipany was extinguish
ed, as such seizure and salo destroyod the objects for which
the corporation was institufted.
2. Involuntary Death.
in EnglandI t.he Crown may create but cannot at pleasure
dissolve a oo:rporation, or without i.s consent alter or amend
its charter. (D'nuthi_ Q v. W, zl 'heat. 657 ;
; sod. 54.) Parliament, being theoretically
oruipotent, may do so, alto:*'> t1,here are but few iltstances
of the power ever being exercised. (ix v. Azqry., 2. orm
11
Ki/,5- ; Lm v. Ar G £l., , Abb. Pj., - . 5. 1N1.0.)
,n cuas tm . " e.f0to i;ilat-ure cax,,ot di;solvo a pii-
vat: coxIporaot.iOn without i-ho corpjorat,.Ion '; oon-;oi.. (i
iouth Colleve v. Wgdward., 4, Vbeat. S18 ; Iankt H d 11p v.
L~n-aINO 0 2. Ilc.9 1hB Q-v. 00 ,.Y 25 His.
127 ; Wood.ork v. UnionBank., " Gold. '18L.) This iul'e ap-
plie except iL ,ase, where the Oer -to repeal has boen ex-
)-essi l resorved. (SnydjL v. iJLQ.Qr, 0 '".. , In £ra
RU!3ij)roaiY & ,,.'" N:. Y. I), Balo. j_. -Qo_. v. ,47
;!Jc. 31, ; I o f v. Cmv, 8; Pa. St. 287.) The ex-
pression o" t1,1- reservod power nay b found either in the
chox.+:.0- i+.sel f, or in the gweral act. of incorporation, or in
the er o l lasvi, or evon in the constitution of thu State.
v. j- ' D. " , 5 ilar. 454; .3LL v. fMlzain-
, , , IT. J. 1. P ,8 ; '!ah on, 25 B arb. 4 .0,
Hq.v_, v. LMa, 15 Wa!!. 5O) ; Qojl v. Wal.k, 17 iJ.
Y. 502. This power, howover, whe,.,.hu qualified or unquali-
fioi, should be exorcised onl; with great, noderation and oau-
The Feder l Govornnent c oarinu fiLrwJe confer-
red by a Stat.e, and within i w. p j oi jurisdiction, :unldss -1,o
accomplish some fedoral purpose. C, ' " Ia1" -"
drawn or 9innullod only by :i, tky of i , 'f.hi'L>
thoC". (2 t..lorawets on Private Oorporation, p. 973, Uoto te)
Abo o limited :,it term of life
expires upon i.YL. happenin; of any prosoribed event or con ,:-
, v. lnder'hijlj r3 77. Y. :-:, _.) '?here is, however, a
d.i.tion t.o be obierve, between i-he ,;ords liri M1, i .0o ex-
istenc,, of a corporat.ion until -,tbo happening of a presca-ibed
even, and a )rovision making t.-ho happeninr, of an evc._-_t. a cause
for declaring a forfeitue of the charter, or upon condition
subsequent. This distinction is very clearly put, by Judge
IoLellan in the case of i j a. li. .jLO. v. nz7
(7 Cald. 43P), vihore ho says, 'If tho act. of in corporat ion
fixes a definite t,i ie in which the charter shall expire, as,
for instance, in i.venl.y years, theie can be no doubt thal, when
the period of time expires t.he corporation is dissolved. ;u;-
when the continuance of a corporation beyond a fixed time is
made to depend upon the performance of a piven condition there
can be no doubt that t.>o non-perfoiance of the condi-,.ion is
a more groumd of forfeiture. This, however, an be tiuion ad-
vi-tage of only by t1he %tate in a proceeding in tVhu nature of
a za i .toQ _-nd th: existence of a corporation can nlbvar be
co]laterally called in question.'
On the subject of misusor and non-uier, it-. Justice
Itory, in tlie o.se of TQrie±. v. Taylor (9 Cranch, 51), said
'A priwito corporation created by the legislature may lose its
franchises by a maiusor or a non-user of them ; and they may
be resumed by the government under a judicial judgpent upon a
4a-7w' o..to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture. This
is the common l , of the Ian,! and is a tacit condition annex-
ed to t.he creation of every su:ch corporation.'
But acts which aore improper do not of themselves ;work a
dissolution. Its lerpl existence nevertheless continues un-
ti] thm government which created the corporation, through
proper judicial proceedings, procures an adjudication and en-
forces the forfeiture of the charter. (92msey V. _f, M u4
), U;i O a'b. 8UO.) Even where the terms of tlo charter are
that the corporation shall be dissolved upon ,.the non-perform-
ance of a condition, the mere failure to perform is not ipaQ
&,o a dissolution. It is a cause of forfeiture to be ju-
dicially determined. (InIii f/ i, 7 :ioi. Pr. '"7 ;
Qolf v. i-janha ,t_., 9 Wend. Ila rre  1n . Qo. v.
R 7 Cald. 420.)
It requires something5 more than ordinary ne!lij;once, or
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excens of power, or more mistake in the mode of exorcising an
aoknowlededod power, on the part of a corporation to warrant a
forfeiture of its char ter. There must be in general a plain
abuse of power by which the corporation fails to fulfil ,he
desig n and purpose of its orlganization. (ijlia V. Nip.3.
SI aL. 1 Iiq. U02 ; Vudv. 3 Il , 7 Paigo,
2R4 Mate v. P fa., 8 1 . i. 182.)
To cause a forfeiture, the act of misuser or non-user
must relate to the matters which are of t],e essence of the
contract between th)e State and the corporation, and they must
be wilful and repeated. ( v. laa. Valley j , , ,5
Hiss. 60 .) An isolated act, not, producing mischievous con-
sequences to any one nor contrary to tlbu express requisitions
of the charter, and not wilfully comnitted, is no grotmd for
forfeiture. (RaoLe v. Bi- intoL 2ua =v ., *P3 Wend. P22 ;
Sa . 2, , 8 R. 1. 182.) All th ,.t is requisite
to defeat a claim of forfeiture is a reasonable and substan-
tial perfonmance of the conditions in the cbarter. (Pepl
v. Will igahuC Tui' & 9J 47 17 .158 epe .Enj
t= TW-rIw ,_n. 23 Wand. 193.)
Where there is an abuse of a particular department of an
entire franchise it is a cause of foi feiture of the whole
lb
franchi;e, but, if this particular franchise was added to the
corporation subsequent, to it.,- creation, sucli particular fran-
chise may 1;e forfeited and the v<.idue re:-ain. (Zuq.IB V.
Tbf.r" are two ways of enforcing a forfeiture : by a
sir facia, and by on iriforiJ,.ion in t,. ntiun of a
warl-i-o, 'A saoS_ f is propor wbeire there is a legal
existing body capable of actinU, but who have ben .iilty of
an abuse of ,o,,er entrusted to th ; . . . . and a 4qirnwx_-
r where t+,ere is a corportte body Au Ld±&, who take upon
themselves to act as a body corporate, but for some defeat in
their contf,iJtVuion they cannot legally exercise the powers
they affect, to ;.se.' (per Ashurst, J., in B= v. E
3 Durnford & East. PA4.)
In ik L' York these urits bare been abolished, and by Sec-
tion 1786 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Attorney-General
of ,,,h i fa,.e may maintain cm. action as pescribed by Section
17815 for the dissolution of a corporation by forfeiture of it-
franchise,, in the name and on behalf of the people of the
State. The same section also makes a provision by which, on
the oission of the Attorney-Genoral to comence the action
within a specified time, a creditor or a stockholder may main-
tain 9. a action hineif. !,.it grotuds of forfoiture can-
no, ht ~~,, .- ld i:o collateraly, oi- in any othor w ay than
by a clirect procoding institute!] for tba!t )',pose. Tu
d0, 10. Y. 327 ;Lr*,, r. il, v. f[.
39 'it. J  I,. 2 )
The ta,.e. mj waive the ,,rounds of forfeiture either by
express lefislatwive enactment. or by acts which recognize the
exi tence of the corporation after the cau se.of forfeiture has
accrued. ip. v. Ltnbahta j(, 9 Wend. 3b1 ; Corioa
walhv. Unionu ]I D_., b Man.. 2'31 ; Peoile v. Phoni
J3--l, 24 VYend. 431.) overtheless, an act of the ltsla-
ture will not be deemed a .,aiver tune~s -,p e !eislative intent
in that. respect be expresily declaried or is nec..v aijy. im-
plied froom it., action. (P v. Soineremoih, 10 N. ii.
375 ; 1 v. Talbot, 7 Gray, 120 ; v. Ki4fl
Turm. __. 23 lifend. 190.)
The forfeiture of a chqrter can be enforced only in the
courts of the b y which t,!e corporation received its,
corporate existence. (lMortjing_.Q.. v. Lgcko, 50 Ala. 332.)
Whet,her a corporation has forfeited its chartor is a question
to be de±,erj.nined by a cout, of lavi ; a court of equit.y, um-
17
1 "o' e." '1 y elpvi ; rerl st.-tute, cnnot de,re, a forfeit-
II e (oyl v. Raerles-3 fo. Barb. ,U
JI'--LIm. •O. , 8 IluinpA. .B.
i! At , orIO -,+ o i,,'ii +, rd, inqolvenxy v;i'- a pymui
of forfit-u,' . ; but as the osseson of pro"o,.;, is not es-
santial t~o +J'e existenCe of -a it foll.vs, tI>on
inso Ivancy wou !d not have td . effect, and its loLa! existence
wnuld riot thus be tertninated. (T1pof.p- G iL. Ca. v. ____-
dor, 2 Pick ).40. So A f be preiont tim0.e insolvency of a
corporato.on and an tsigjtirivr.int of all ,,,. ',3ou, for the bene-
fit of cireditors, or" the appoiritmer t of a r,.ceiver, k:ill not
er, igti ',  i,.. .er s+ or putp an end to _.it corporate ex-
(Tov v. s%U Basin, 2 Dough. 530 ; E L-
13. L , 35 li., 410 ; Kini v. avinello,
Y. a k of I!isf.02 v. Paliguinoaue Pn, 1 Wall.
,-S ; a v. Val1ki Dazmk, 7 , ,. )
PAT II.
The Effect, of the Death of a Private Corporation.
There are three parties interested in the .,io'kings of
every private corporation : the State, the stockholders and
'third parties', as creditors and persons having a cause of
action against the company as for tort. The interests of
the 'third parties' and the stockholders are antagonistic,
while the function of the State is to look after the welfare
of both parties, by properly regulating the action of the cor-
porate body.
Hjence the interests of tho State may be considered as be-
ing centered in the corporation as an entity, and in its just
and equitbl e managemen, , ,.M tho means best adapted to the
performanoe of the State's duty. It cunot be claimed, how-
ever, tha, t.he interests of the State are on te same .otLr-
dation,-- pectniary gain,-- as those of either the stockhol-
ders or creditors, or even the pecuniary interests of the Xng-
lish monarchs. While the Itate needs a revenue, it does not
resort, in these modern times, to those crude methods that
were in vogue a century ago as, for example, the rule that
the personal estate of a disRolved corporation eacheated to
the Crown,-- for the sole purpose of increasing the Orov=
revenues. io such selfish interests can be attributed to the
3,ato in this country. Its interests are those of the poo-
plo, and hence are vested in that corporate entity which, in
the best. manner, protects them from the fraud or imposition
of a few by boing vise.y and justly supervised.
None of the authors upon the subject, of corporation law
seem to 'make any logical claisification of the effects of t'-o
death of such bodies. From what ha% boon said concerning
the three interested parties, it will be seen that there is
a logical basis, and, as aell, a convenient, one. Then, upon
the death of a private corporation, there will be a consider-
ation, in due order, of the effect upon the rights and liabil-
ities of :--
1. The corporation, considered as representing, tho in-
terestsq of the State, and in regrard to its real and porion.al
property, debts, contracts and pending suits ;
2. The stockholders, concerning the assets, debts and
property of the corporation ; and
3. Third parties, as creditors, either against the com-
pany or stockholders, and persons other than creditors, having
ri hts in the corporate assets.
1. The Rights and Liabilities of tbe Corporation.
By the strict rules of the comnon law, a!! real estate
held by a corporation at the time of its dissolution reverted
tn the grantor and his heirs, while all the personal property
vested in the Crown, in England, and, in this country, in the
people of the State in their sovreign capacity. (Ait±_ay-
G v. Qoyer, 9 Hod. 224 ; Note in 7 Am. St. Rep. 717 ;
v. Robetson, b7 hi. De. 170 ; Std Bank v. StatD.
1 ,latch. u) t to a great extent modern le5;islation
has modified these cormon law rules. In this country they
have bean 1 enerally rejected, even in the absence of statutory
provision upon the subject. (Aka v. Edona. Di , 8 Peters,
B v. Robrtsan, 18 flow. 480; Raed v. Phrankforn
!te. 318 ; 1 V. Lilleo* 4-6 Barb. 361. )
The prevailing rile of the present day seems to be that
upon the dissolution of a corporation all its real and per,-,o-
nal property constitute the assets for the payment of the cor-
porate debts, and after such debts are paid, the remainder,
if any, i s distributed = r among the stockholders. (rib
v *1 ank Wall. Ji. 33 ; RarralI v. WalyxickA. &4
7,- '. Y. 211 ; 8 1. Y. It. S. P68-4, and ases )
Where a corporation owns a right of way or other franchise
by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, there -Suems
to be, upon dissolution, some difficulty in determiring its
disposition. In a late case in N1ew York Pp v.
1M] N. Y. I), wheio the legislature, exercisin; its reserved
right of repeal, annullod fJ.e charter of a railroad oompany,
it was held t.hat the right of way and the right to use the
same did not, revert to the State, but passed as piroperty to
the receiver for the benefit of the creditors and stockholders
of the oorpnration. This deoision seems to be sou.d upon
theory, and the principle that it, is a property right has be-
come the goneral rule so far as one has been established. (ILt.L
I-en B o. v. Dlarwre, 114 U. S. 501 ; Wa-ha v. WaL-
mare l. & flso., 92 14. C. 322 ; baily v. Platt, D. ,
21 Pac. Rep. 3b.) But in Pennsylvania, upon the death of a
railway corporation, the franchise of the i'ight of uiay vests
in the State, and fhe State may grant it to ,nother railroad
company. (&ij:1.. f.9. v.. , 23J Pa. St. 287.) While
in Ohio the right of way reverts to the original ovmer of t1he
land or his assigmee in fee. (, L , D±,i. Dar V. a'le-
L, 1. Ohio 0. (. Rep. 24-6.)
Where a corporation has been dissolved by a judyi nent ren-
dered in a cotut of comrpotent Jurisdiction, the property r'it
of such corporation cannot. be confiscated by the gta-, or
affect ed in any way. The judLmrernt terminates only t!,he fran-
chise of existonce. (I v. R le.18w, 4I,.o,
Stt/Di v. I I Blatch. 267.)
At common 1 Q]x!, all debts due to and fron the corporation
upon dis~ oution became extinouished. This is a harsh and
inequitable rule, and it seems has never to a tgreat extent
been adopted and acted upon as the rule in this country. In
fact, the contrary seems to be tho tendency ; so that, as a
general 1 )ropo,ition, debts are not destroyed, but may be en-
forced and utilized for the benefit of those interested, al-
though the corporation may not, sue in its ovm name. Ior
v. ,Jtit,, 6 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 34. ; giI. v. t, 81 6-Lb.
641 ; G v. Union aoij)-htflq, ,l0 U. S. 13 14=a
Y. P .0_., 8 Peters, 281 ; lacon v. iQbortsof, 18 flow.
480 ; People v. O'Brien, M 14. Y. 1 ; Note in 7 Am. St. Rep.
717 ; Bank of[g. v. W ,ils. 19 Lt. Ann. 1.)
A corporation, for convenience, changir is nwae, con-
tinuing the same gcneral business, with the sane officers, il
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st,i]l responsible under it, new nuaie for all debts previously
-B~,, ,,a fj -ic
at'_ Appeal, ' Pa. 9: Vt. V.
B~nj.51 Ga. 58.)
The fact, that a private corporation has privat, contl'acts
does not, force upon it perpetuity of existence. It must be
presuned that the partio understood the nature a-d incidents
of such a body and made their contracts with refereceo to
them. (ihmna. v. P .i . , 8 Peters, 261 ) IlCor00 if, was
held in tn e, rly case in Tennessee (Whit v. SQnybe!ii, b ikuaph.
3,')) that a dir solution operates to rescind all oxisting, con-
tracts entered i--,o either b, or with the corporation, and no
further right, could have boon acquired by or against it. This
.ppears to have been the early ipeneral doctrine and is in ac-
cordance wvith ±,he old oommon law principlosof corporation law.
But mode:'rn legeislation has done away with this by providing
for the appointment, of receivers to wind up the affairs of
the corporation,-- to perform a!! exoisting contracts, collect
debts,, &c. it is in confor-1mity with this mod rn doctrine
that a ]ease to a corporation is not terminated by dissolu-
i:i on, and its covenant to pay rent does not thereupon cease
to be obligatory. ( p v. t ioal., 82 i. Y.
.;"I )
s..t )U. j
.u 1., by and C,.aainst a coi'poration weio abated by it.s
death. Thig was the conion lawe do,+, rine. It hJ: been large-
ly miodified by ,tatuit, oither by 1,eoneral logislrAtive enact-
ment. or by provision in the charter itself. (;iOu1 1 otugh v.
14,n1iodo, '58 1. Y. ,b82 ; Nationl 1l v. CI0, 2 'gall.
,;')) ; T1?usct, aloa Asj-j', v. Gietn 4B Ala. 84± fma. v.
Peolea Tja,. (L._no $, I! 11. 1:'11 ;, v
W. Va. 4 1 LInt.Qrn ina1 Pu;p QQ,, T.. R. 3 D(T. iv.
519:4 JaL'oyd, ,V'_ lO., " " 1,. P.. U; Oh. Di v. ,.,.)
I-Apole a co'poration t0nsolida6os with others, chsnjing
it's n0, ire.+# 'h, v a soit pendin: awa:i,,'. it., it hz3 been
held that nhis wi~ o such dissolution that the suit abates.
(gi~st Tenn.1 J - _. v. 83a, i fleisk, JOY ; I. & a. ± q
v. " "ssejl Grant 's (Aase, 348 ; Bgo v. ji-a., '. Y.
139.) 1Nor does 4.be couvolidation inptir the oxi-,;enae of
t~her Oor poration for thi-. purpose of prosecuting suits pre-
v, la. v5 co; e co. (Sak f or v. J'[i ju-P
. . . v. tuasuirnta, Crat's Gases,
348.) And a corporation mLLy b:e, restrained from taking stops
in a State court while a suit i3 pending against it in the
A
Federal courts, (Eisk v. Uuio 2 1latch. bid.)
00
More a corporation has boon deprived of its legal exis-
i, no, ir: the :tbsonce f satute, no valid judg ment can be
rendred uyu;, i, subsequent to the t ue of i"i. dissolution'.
1 P8 Mas s 32 b ; g DI~Jamp n.a,4- fap. 9 L. It, 19 Bq . 202)
So, oven on jud ,monts in favor of the corporation, no exoau-
tion can issue regularly in the corporate nme, and if one be
sued out it may be quashed ; and judgments rendered against
the corporation m.ay be impeached by a party interested in the
arbinistration of its as3ets. (jay v. fn k, 92 Iob.
Dolonv. jiont-,, !. ' . 44o2 ; ajijU v.-_u fl
Bn 81 Me. 57.) But, however, when a judgnent is rendered
for or ag-ainst a corporation after its dissolution, without
that fact having been regularly brought before the court, it
seems th,(. judgment is valid, on the ground that the parties
wnuld be estopped from setting up the fact as long as the
judgment is mireversed. (M,_ v. 11=k a,, 2 Rob. 5i6
Cf. 40 An. Dec. 72 .)
In most of the States there are statutes relating to the
dissolution and vwindintg up of corporations, which provide for
the continuance of the capacity to sue and be sued, so that
the assets may be collected and claims against the compmay ,iaj
be enforced. Receivers or truste:., are al';o scmotime ap-
pointed for t.his purpose. A priwite busine,--" cor.poration
which fails to wind up its business when its charter expires,
but continues in its charter name +-o carry on its _-orporate
business, i be sued in the corporate name for a tort com-
mitted by it after +!,e expiration of its charter. (i v.
Q_ 9.0.,, 31 W. Va. 836.) Rut. this is a diversion inlo d
Iactg corporation law.
2. The ights and Liabilities of the Stockholders.
It. is a principle of law well settled that, unless other-
wise provided by statute, "a stockholder, the full par value
of whose stock has boon paid in, is not. liable and cannot be
made to pay any sunis in addition thereto.' (Cook on 9tock,
etc., Sec. P41.) This principle lies at. the foundation of
the rights and liabilities of stockholders, and many problems
w-e solved by its proper application, whetber the corporation
is solvent, or insolvmt.
Upon tlie ,_,c.olu,,or of solvent. co poration, the stoci-
holders are entitled %.o share in the stuplus assets remaining
after the claims of creditors have been satisfied, and this in
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proportion to the mo.m.ts contributed by tihn'i to te oapital
stock. W . '""2 v. h .
IW4L, 56 Ca!. 4 ; flua I v. ,1L i_ D, 7'5 1. Y.
211 ; ll v. G jir. .Q, , /A Fad. fI0.) In makingi_ the
distribution of the assets. each stockholder is to be charged
with the debts duo from him to the corporation. (j V.
W, 10 Paioe, & ; 9. b74. )
Each shareholder who is also a creditor is to have hi.
claims paid, and i-hen to share in the pgjr distribution
aftervard. Otherwise it wvould work irjustico. Also, when
a stockholder's subscription is fully paid and others are not,
he haa a right to a return of the excess paid by him above the
others before any division of the balance is made. This is
in accordance with the doctrine of = rat distribution.
(Krb. v. Carlil.e t , , 2'af . JL .)
But in tbe case of an insolvent oorporation, the stock-
holders have no rights a, stockholders, for the vwhole assets
are to be used in a V payment of corporate debts ,--
there boin[7 nothing left for a surplus distribution. But i t
'would meem tht a itockholder who i4 al o a creditol' of the
corporation has a right to have tat claim sottld as a credi-
tor, though he wan have no preference sho-vm him by virtOe of
his beilijg a stookboldei'.
In ,h. ,as, f o. iLc s o , ih iupany, it. hag ,u, held
..at Pya not. ont.Atled §.o paynrient of thbor saL±lu in
.refoeence to the duis of othea' creditors, but. mus{',. oofne in
tith the lait.or for theii ratable proportion of the a"set
though it se,;Ws I K,..f o:e of 'Lthen ,!s indobted to the ;orn-
pany he can have his salary sot off againsi, t- debt. (In
re Groton ,iL Co., O . 3h. 642 ; f. 1
L. R. I-, Sq. 4.)
A debt due a shareholder from th.j company and assitpod by
h:i after cot.n.encerent. of 'w'inding up' proceedingm is subject
to a right of set off by the company of all calls made subse-
quent to te assigirnent and previously to the payment of the
debt,. (J 1in, L:. ,, ,. L. 7 Eq. 240 ; f. .. Jj-
worth, T. -4. 2 Eq. 578.)
It has been held i alifornia that, corporate property
after dis-olution is to be t reatUed as partneo-ship assets and
divided accordingly. v. Suaitdt.y,3 Cal. ) This
is but another way of expressing the priciple that, the assets
of a corpora-,ion is a fund for the benefit of croditors and
stockholdei-s. Arnd, in accoirdanoe t.beioiith, i thu property
be divided among the stockholders leaving debts unpaid, every
sfockholder having; his f,are of tho proport; i- liJ.lo D2.0-
X .,a to cofribu, - fd or ,h- ,h uge of such dobti, out. of the
prpe't i hc'banids or its proceeds. (ilaqtin{' v. kw
I--)( htow,. Pr. 2
Altfhough I-.he minority of t.ho st,,,ckholder o- ot complain
merely because the majority of the itockholdors have di olved
the co!orat.ion and sold its p.'opea'ty, it has been held that
they may just.ly conplain because the majority have exorcised
their powers in a way to buy fihe property for themselves, and
exclude the minority from a fair participation in the proceeds
of the sale. 'When a number of the stockholders combino to
constit,ute thonsolves a majority in order to control the cor-
poration as they see f!+,, they become for all practical pur-
-oses the corporation itself, and assume thLI trust relation
occupied by the corporation tow xvd its shareholders. Al-
though stockholders are not pa't.ner , nor st.iictly toais in
coimnon, the,3 Pre the beneficial joirt owners of the corporate
propert.y, having an intercs-, tand a power of legal control in
exacti ooportion to fheii' r'espective amo,unt.s of stock. The
orpoi-7-0ion ii.rol f h--oldq its p'operto/ as a trIust fund for the
stockholders, who have a joint intereSt in all its property
and effects, and the I-elation between it, and iti several mem-
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bors is f"or all practical 'J'osc. that of a t.'istco and =a-
L.i qU9 t1- S.t (Per !,. , J. ,J ld V. ll V-A
m. v,.Qo , 27 Fed. 62,1 ; Of. 28 Fed. 838.)
A person riay in payri-oiit for stock convey property to the
corporation ; and 1ho may also contract th',t upon dissolution
he hall receive back t , t., property. Tho. this c--not- be
done to t,. prejudice of credif.ors. (F v. . j1Q,
25 Fed. 79,5.)
There are one or tmo distinctions botur-en th~e holdint,,s
of the Enlish and the American Courts, that it. m.ay be well
to conside:, at, t.is point. The cocurts in both countries hold
that ti capi,al stock of , company is a fund in vhich both
the stockholders and tho creditors are interostod. But here
is where a division +.:.kea place. Amolirican corts con-
sider tat thi, f,.nd if.d for the be: &fit of creditors and inci-
dentaly the. stockholders, while in the &hiJlish courts there
are no traces of -uich a doctrine. On the contrary, the ob-
ject, of ,. c i n-lish 'Windi:- Up' Act of 1848, as stated by
one of its ovm autbors, .i Joh. omilly, "was to obtain a
proper contribution tvm,-,. mebers of th , partnership and
to 'lave their ii,'s and liabilities ascertained iitei V,
The creditors have nothing to do ...ith this, atd they may have
execution againt the company in any mrinor they may think
fit. " (Wa Phailips ," iiavu. , (52., 610. )
Even uider the Companies Act of 18.U2, wh 1c>, vias forimed
with a view to tWc vindi- up of companies for, the bonefit
of creditors as wve!l as of qtockholders, it is obvious. rom
the expres..ionrs of the judi os in xindinr tp Lrocoudirngs that
the rights of "o sihareholders are looked to rathor tharn the
right s of creditors. , v. 1,. t,. 3 ii. of L.
7ia. )
The rights of creditors are so ca'fu!ly lmided by the
American comts that persons will be held to t-fe liability of
stockholders if they suffer themselves to be hold outo to the
public as sue-h. UII XQ f : 1. Y. 17 ;
MI-dQlrev. Whel Ur $ 4) Pa. St. 832 ; hapv. 1L.rria-cBan
19 Pick. 5 64 ; l v. QlaTheland, 36 id. 476.) As in the
case of the Reciprocity Dmak 11 where a woman. bought
,}ua-es of .tock while a sgo arnd afterwar-d married, the
stock remaining in her nmue, it was held t,".t she was liable
as a stockholder upon the bInk becoming insolvent, and could
not oscapo g,..uch liability under e,'oi -. !i,. di.-,ability.
Under t !iLh la,4, however, she woUld not v been
held liable. The ilouse of Lords and the English Lords
Justice-) of Appeal seem +,o haw settled upon the doctrire
that. the rights of creditors against shareholders exist only
n rwhI. 9 ch pa=y' ; that, tbey can-, in foneral,
only cluir: 'to be paid out of .be assets of the company, vihicTh
a,- , s are limited to wabat ,e company had a rit.'j. to ....
into tbe assets. (±Lth- C , L. li. 2 Mh. T- UIU
U.Deatom v. KLaL, l. ,. 2 ,". of L. 99; Waberhou v.
2, n ..ba,1T.. of L S. %. 29 Ca"inas, 10
iiv. l_. ) In the Reciprocity Bank c.ase (. ), the colm-
pany could not have enforced its claim agairnt tho. mariud
woman, under the Rngl ish law, and thce creditors would Iv;ve had
no rif:11.1 ,qainst her.
Another ri itinction betvwtoen the coiu'ts of the tvio coui,-
tries; is foiud in t, e application of a rule which both rocofj-
nize. The rule is that tbe stockholders have a right to
transfer their shares of itock. tir. Thompson, in .his viork
on the 'Liabilitieg of Itockbolders' (Sec. 211), {ivs 1.1e
English dockrinc as follovs : 'Aftw Much consideration of
this subject, to inlisb courts have s:,,led upon ,' rule
,,.. a man may transf&r his shares to a m= f a
time when the company is in a failin condition, for the ,olo
puwpoie of escaping liability, and for a nominal considora-
tion mewly, or as a mere ift ; and, if the trnMsfer is
out and out9 ... is not melely colorable, a sham, the trans-
foes vn:iui~ a trustee for t0he transferor --- tho dovice
b.l l l U u-o fu! ; the {,ransferor vnll escape liab.lity
gs a con,, biut-- y and hontest siaroholders and creditors will
suffor ,,or lqa;ly. . I. it. 7 (,h. 292 ;
I,. ;. Th* 2k~ 'Pto llrrso; -,Cfaa., L. ~
Oh. 2; ; ~~O~e, it. Oh. Div. b7.)
,iv). Thompson (Sec. 216, i , s"ms up th iu wrican
doctrine as fo!lows : 'A ti rarsfer of shares in a failing
corporattion, made by the transferor, vuith the purpose of es-
caping .hi5 liability as a shareholdor, to a person \yho, from
uan, caue, .is incapable of r sponding in respect ( SPch li-
ability, is void as to t'rhe creditors of tI)o company and as to
o'"er sto•k-olde, although as betwen the t-,ransforor and
the transfereo the transfer .... have been out and out.'
(l1ithan v. Milok 3 Ed. Oh. 211b ; Ovdt L v- JaLK-
W ..... " " ilhr v. G. . I 9. Li0 Mo. "  •0
Iigc v. 1 7 i,,a s. 3 30.)
i. rof an -article in the AlbLmx (Vol.
20, p. 3'4)criticises *.[. Thompson', statement of the doc-
trine of the American courts, by showing that most of t>-
3.4.
cases cited in support of it, are o and not directly do-
cisions upon the point, lie further says that the doctrine
'can hzu'dlyj be regarded as authoritatively settled in this
comtry, . . . . whatever we may think upon principle. I le
that as it, may, it is a strong indication of the drift, of the
judicial Minds of t.he country. The L-aerican doctrine will
stand the test of principle and equity. Under it fraud %qd
subterfuge cannot be practiced --- shares of great, nominal
value cannot be transferred, when a corporation is in failing
circ"umstances, to mere 'men of straw' , for perchance a pound
or a shilling, or even where the transferee has boon paid for
the taking- of then, thus an escape of just liability.
3. The Rigbts and Liabilities of Third Parties.
'It is a rule well settled and generally observed', says
,. Beach (2 Beach's Private Corporations, Soc. !228), 'that
the death of a corporation leaves unimpaired the rights of
credif,ors to its property in paymnort, of tir debts, in vhat.-
ever ma:-aner the dissolution may have been bro,,,At about. The
capital stock and assets form a fund in the hands of the di-
rectors, as trustees, for the payment of their clais. W _1iis -
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485 ;. v. Lo..p, ' all .*%ulO ; J A. ileQ v. 11±0.-,
Wca'ksg 1.-31 U. S. 3,52 Chc"",a jf~.v hcg I.
tOnal BaIrk, 14 17 . S. ,,,.
lost, of V.be Qtatoe; have statutes refulatin ,; tho 'ights
of creditors upon the dissolution of a corporation. But even
in the absence of such statutory provisions, creditors are
sufficiently protected by the equitable rule that, t.ho corpor-
ate funds are held in trust for creditors, and ,;uch funds may
be followed i:nto th1e hands of any p'arty, except bonaide
creditors, or purchasers without notice. (&xi;4z v. lioag, 7
Wall. 610 ; .Sh1 Yzjfuy Co.Qa v. Ipn 85 Pa. St.. 2b
I ______ v. 1h'ex, it) Iov. Pr. 214, aff. 76 U. Y. 9.)
A State law which deprives creditors of their satifac-
tion from the effects of a corporation, and which appropriates
such property to other uses, impairs the obligations of the
contracts of such corporations, and consequently is invalid.
(Ourran v. tate, 16 liow. 304 ; Gi v. 14o.dy, 8 11. Y.
479.)
As a general rule, a creditor must, first exhaust, his rem',,,-
dy against, the corporation before he can proceedai-e; the
stockholders. (4hillin~on v. , 53 N. Y. 3t/
Lidl a v V. S, P Abl. P . N. 1. 39 ; Priest v.
I . , 15h ikas. 380 ; jj i V ' __v . 2. Fi.
UQ. 86 a. 239.) When al the property of ,a corporation
has boon sold on execution, and the co)poration aL,,, , ' has
ceased to do business, there is no need of resuscitatilng , he
company in order tb,t t.he creditors may have t-bcir remedy a-
gainst *,he stockholders individially --- t,-ieir liability be-
comes primal ar-d absolute. (mil V.  , 2 Jop
Oh. 00 ;8 Cowen, 387 ; Kerr' s Business Corporz:.tiora, 30o.)
If there are several ereditors, and the assets rae suf-
ficient to discharge all debts, there should be a p;: rt
distribution. a v. n , 8 oeyr, .'..) And tho
surety of +,}, corporation, virho.., is as suoh -urety, is only
entitled to core in ratably v,:,ii, h the other crodito's. (In
roton !ns, . Co., 2 Barb. Oh. 360.) But where a creditor of
the company obtains a lien upon its real and personal propectj,
by judgment or by the levying of an execution thereon, before
the order' of a court is obtained for the 2_of a z
ceiver', and for the dissolution of such corporation, such
creditor c¢a.ot be deprived of the prefeercic]e h'Fi th's3
acquired!. (In r Ite9_, 8 Paige, 880.)
In early times it, ,as thought, that a corporation was in-
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cipable of oo,itt, inU a to.'t. Lit it is a prinliiplu hrov/ w("1
SAtt,led that, a corporation .a. coirit riost varieti6s of torts
and they are held !iDble to ,:, ae extent as naltUrl per-
song. (I ieII v. ,_ i,. Y. 258 smith V.
1 athbunL~dJ. Dr.023 Ttsv. Tu6pi:- Ulad 611. Y. 237;
£abna±L. _% S. Louis. DapL. 111L. 2 14o. App. 060 ; I'aa v.
iiat.on-BLL. Co, 463 Texas , 272; .Lnuan v. ieralit .lm±sf. !jP,,
27 Ia. Ann. 367 ; Il-b r v. 10  i4'7- , d.)
This liability extends to every grade and description of for-
cible, m(alicious or negligent tort or wrong which they com-
mit, howvever foreign thoiir nature or beyond their* granted
povers the wongful transaction or act may be. (i. D,
ae .c. v. Rohllly.!r., 34- 11. Y. 30o ; Wet2.-i Uno Tj IQ v.
E'ru.er, P. Cal . 141 ; Pebl. v.i -Gano i&. , 77 11. C.
2f,3 ; ittburg .v. Tiaa, 19 Ohio St. 1,7 ; Gook
on Stock, etc., Sec. 698.)
When companies consolidate, the act tuder which they do
so general1 y provides for the continuance of the sepa'ate ox-
istence-. of .he old companies in regard to all outst'.wdig ob-
ligations to third parties, i-c.uding those arising out. of
tort. (In .Selma3, 4 .L a-,p , A) Ga. 706 o ai&±m v.
i . , 'I) A)a. 082. For tort, see S v. 1i
41 (T, I 16 (3raay, 407 ; U. Y. Rai!roa Law, ec 73 .
189, ,hap. -) ; uIness Corp. Taw, Amendent, of l Se e .
12 ; Cen. Tat: o ,. , P.)_ - , . 13(3 ; _owa Code ,
"12P7. Codeo of Ala., Suo. 54. East Tuii._ v.
1t; Hun, 144 ; Pe='C. ,,,s !6 Wall. 190.)
IN+, 'f .t, becomel, of such action when a corporation goes
olit of exis+,ence seems never to have been before the highest
courts of thie land ; either State or Federal courts, or even
the Enlgish courts. At common law it, is clear that such ac-
tions were aba+,ed,-- and this Lifves us a hint of a reason why
such a case has never come before the higher courts. In New
Yoa'k the question is coming; up, apparently for- the first time,
in a cotple of cases in which the fUnin E CoDk. of Brooklyn
are defendan'.s. Both wiere actions for t,': tort or negjiigence
of +,be jbix Ej ,a., or its employees, before the expira-
ti.on of t,be cbarter of the company, it having expired by lapse
of fime durJr; the pendency of thE suits. A motion via3 made
by. the plain+ .iff to continue the actions against those direc-
tors who were in office at the time of the corporation's
death. 2.GafJ v. fl elfr. ,. (13 14. Y. ,kupp. 878) was
the first case. The motion was atrged in the City Coourt of
]q'o A:)yn before judgoe Cloi.,, and on Apir21 10th, 1891, thj
mo~f.ior, was Jenied. In 1 a.,  1,,t '.i.s pas3led (I. J329, (hap.
)9O, -',. 4) .by which u.h acta.orIs as tho one i.- question
ctild heen cont inued to fina! judgner,.t. But, in 1880
(1. 1880, Chap. , the bav, of 188;1 v'as repealed and part, of
it, i rco) pc ,ted iit o the (,ode of Oivi! P,'ocedmUe, LAt Se-o
4, of .-,<., Law iis never re-enacted. So, it' ,h language of
the !earned Judge, 'Theve is, thei-,fore, no st.atute in force
in this -,a..e for- t,. - oontinuance of ft,2;i4 action, 1, less the
directo)' ae to be treated as truste,,,s fo;' , Aaiaff.
An action abates when no sf,at,,ite exists fc i-,A cl-ttinuanco.
Gro. v V. C"), 3toryt 607 ; Naionl, v. Q ,
2i Waii. 09.))' And, continini:; the discus7;ion, --- 'The--
fo'e, the only question on this motion is ,hetheor or not the
plaintiff is a 'credito-' of the defendant vithin the _j-, ,,,,
of t-he statute before referred to, as to tho power of dire.-
tors in office at the date of the expiration of the *T}h:.
I have examined the definitions of the word 'creditor', and
can find no definition and no authority tha, a party who has
an action .iending for injutiies -*,o the person can be consider-
ed as such. The motion was denied, tin. adher, "-o th'I
proposition that such actions abated under present 1;u.; Ycrik
t, in a irimilar 'iotion before the ,Special Turn of tho
S , 4Cth: ,.!o,,u-, fo)r 0, e cko -ld O)cpatm .,nnt,, in h , casc of -
vmr ~ ~ ~ th rqUAon!' ~ :C oti .n w,.--,; 'ILIStair h i s
case ,. dt, in 7.,iaY, 1891 , and was argued befor"" Judge
Cullen, who said, in support, of his doc-ision : TThe oa im
made on behalf of the defendant, is tha.± the plaintiff, whose
aio "i fo, a perona tort, is not a
spaking, a uiu ditor is one whos-e claim p-inmj out, of con-
t.act. In" S±.oart V. QW .t,.SfOn ALe .. (O V. Y. b0),
a c, rion car.ier of asasenger's was held to be a ,-;-,-o.
ag.ainst misoonuct on the part, of its evnployeo to its passen-
gpr, and it. is V -utid th such misconduct oni tho paxt of
tn'3 employoc is a breach of the contract of the employer. So
ti is liabiliti., mnay . , to spring out, of contract. T do
not, t hink i+ nec r,,, , lio\evor, to rest ihis decision on that
90,11,. In fl. judjmen t , the provision of the Rovised Statutes
above quoted (Seccs. 9 & 10, Title III, Part I, Chap. 18)
should be oonst,,r,,d liberally, so as o include the ,Iaims of
al] pea-sons a;,i:ist the corporation aisin!- ou, ol 2}e oldi-
nary conduct, of its busineis. . . . . The pouver given to
the trustees by the statuite is broad, 'to settle its a s';
a teoi comrehensivo enoug;h to include all ili liabiliis.
iability for personal injurious, in the operations of a la'ge
'xirier', are a much a part of ±., riunn- expenses as con-
tc%1 eY;)erv3IJf,ui-e3. . .. r) do0 1 -'vK*Y 'l j of aci
WI.solgli =1LLuL pur ona appl)ies to this cu;e. The de-
feu:, , wa.s simniv an artificial being. The claim which t,he
!aintI:ff" had was in roality against the property und asets
Of Vihf. co) por:'tion. it was fromti those that ho ',s ,o ob-
hin . fact, ion. That, pror~o,'Ay still remains m->.-,d is in the
hands of the defendant's trustexes. it u,*rtdainly ',;ould be in-
equitable to deprive the plaintiff of satisfaction of his
& :'.im, if 1e has one, when by the voluntary act of the real
partiei in interest, tbe stockbolders, and end has been put
to the :.oj.%r-,.ion, for under the statute its corporate oxis-
t, ce mig,.-ht lh-lv been continued had the stockholders seen fit
tn do so.'
A few r'emarks nay be pertinent here before considering
the appeal to the ;ereral Term. Rrom Vhe facts of this par-
+i culwy case, the st,0aement thba,+ the stockholders riiJV' have
continue +,e . i ,..t.eno of the coi-porat.on had h!,by ;eon fit
to do so, il unfounded, as te charter of this company had
been renevied once, aid according to the statute fuith,,er ro-
newal could not be had. The learned Judge seems to think
that corporations are exceptions to the old maxim that action
for persona! injury dies with the person, but this evidently
is in conflict with the findamental theory of these Ocreatures
of the law.' From the fact that, these 'artificial beings'
are created for t'De purpose of exercising such functions and
becoming responsible for such liabilities as are exercised by
and attached to natural persons, which are adaptable to these
'creatiu'esu there is no valid reason why this particular case
should be excepted. In fact, if allowed, it would be in con-
flict with the whole theory of the death of corporations as
alr eady established and set forth in this discourse. For
the corporation, tnder modern rules, is treated in exactly
the same way that a natural person would be under the same
circunstances. As far as is applicable, the lavis governing
natural persons are made to govern corporations. Such ac-
t, ions as the one in question do not survive the death of a
natural person, then why should a corporation be an exception
when the law concerning the one is equally applicable to the
other ?
The appeal from this decision was argued at the General
Term in the Second Department, Dec. 1Z-th, 1891, before Par-
nard, P. J., and flykman and Pratt, JJ. ; Dyknan, J., dis-
senitin. Flarn-nmd, J. the opinion, and among other
thinis he says : Tort stands upon the same ba,3is as contract,.
(LIa± tain v. VftkP'r, 12 k.1., ,.- ; ai.._v. dghian, 7 Rim,
563 ; a v. G b2 Barb. 26 ; labenbe' v. 1d
.da (u. Y. App.) 8 .I. Rep. b2d.) Those oases either hold
or approve of the principle that a conveyance made dtuing a
pending litigation, to defeat the collection of a ju.dginent foi
a tort, can be set aside as if it was a contract debt. In
of-her words, the statute creditors embraces those persons
whoso cl aims are based upon torfs." The fallacy of this
reasoning need bardly be mentioned. And, continuing, he
says : "The charter pledges the propert 1, of the corporatioi.
to pay all damages for misfeasanoe of the company's omployocs.
Th c1aw makes the dire,.oLs trustees to aut,tle the affairs of
the corporation, and to pay all debts auainst tho corporation.
The cokurt has the po;er to continue the action which was pend-
ing at, the dissolution of the corporation of necessity. Such
power existed before the Act. of 1832, and exists since the
repeal of 1880.'
The last proposition, that the right existed before tho
Act of .88; , and continues to exist, is not sustained J. the
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case of 14c99u11ough v. J.orwd (58 1'. Y. b62), which is relied
upon by the Judge for the support of his proposition. In
that case the Act of 183;, was expressly relied upon, and in
speaking of the Foturth Section of that Act, Rappallo, J. said:
"Unless suuch an order be made, there is nothing in our stat-
ute. interfering wit-h the comnon law rule that the dissolu-
tion of +,be corporation puts an end to the action, and that
all subsequent proceedings therein are void.'
The argunents presented by Dykanan, J., in the dissenting
opinion, are so strong +,hat at is a great temptation to quote
the vzhole of his opinion, but only the following extracts will
be ,iven :--
5A caun of action for a tort is not an indebtedness, and
it would be contrary to all analogies of law to consider it
sO. If it was a debt, it would survive the death of the
claimant ; whereas the universal rule is that it dies with
h.tm. It required a special statute to enable actions for
wrongs to the property rights or interests of another to be
maintained against the executors or administrators of a de-
ceased wrong-doer, and from that statute is expresly except-
ed actions for slander, libel, assault md battery, false irn-
prisomnent and actions for injury to the person. (3 R. *.,
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5th Ed., p. 746, Secs. 1, 2.) The claim of the plaintiff is
not aqsilgnable, as it would bo if it, created a liability a-
gainst the compiany. So it, required a statute to prevent tho
abatement of an action foi' the recovery of damages for person-
a! iniju'ies by the death of a party after verdict or decision.
(Code, 1ec. 7:u..) Provision is made by law for the enforce-
ment of palnyent of liabilities of deceased persons by a sale
of their real property, but that law could never be applied
in favor of a person who held an unliquidated claim for dam-
ages sounding in toi.:'
'Assault and battery was cormittod upon the plaintiff by
a servant, of tbh defendant, and, if the plaintiff had not, been
a passenger of the defendant., the company would have incurred
no liability for the act ; but because the plaintiff was a
passonger, t-he defendant is responsible foi' the assault, and
batterv mnd the action of the plaintiff is for tho vrong
peirpetrated upon him. The assault furnishes the plaintiff
vitth a cause of action, and hip suit is based thereon.
'In Tfhe case of Se , v. Bilroad . (90 i. Y. ,590),
it, was the object of the court to show in the opinion that
cotiton carriers are responsible for injuries resulting to
passengers from the negligence and wilful misconduct of their
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servants while engaged in the performance of duties which the
carrier owes to passengers, and to manifest the reasons for
such respongibility. The court there docided that wilful
misconduct of the servant imnposed the smre liability as neg-
li.gence, but, that action was for a personal assault upon the
plaintiff, and there is nothing in the case which conflicts
with the viuvm- vie have oxpressed, and nothing to indicate
that the court considered the action itself to be based upon
contract. in that ease* as in this, the damages are claimed
for the ",rong, and not. for a breach of contract.
'It. would be considered a groat abuse of loLgal terms, if
not ( perversion of !aw, to say that an equitable action in
behalf of a judgment creditor to set. aside a conveyance for
the fraud of a judgment debtor in its execution was an action
in tort, because it was based upon fraud, and fraud is a
m-ong ; and yet it would be equally as plausible as the ar-
gument of the plaintiff.
'It seems plain, therefore, that the plaintiff is riot a
creditor of this corporation, and that his action is not based
upon contract in any legal sense. It is equally plain that
the statute which constitutes the directors trustees of the
creditors and stockholders of the dissolve corporation is not
sufficionty comprehonrivo to include this caust; of action
amongi *,ho liabilities to be 1isJigd by such truslees.
These t,,.c c+ are no more .ban atdipointed executors of the
deadl orpora ion, and, as the cause of action does not stir-
v.ve , ho death of the coIpany, the s.it carmot be ,.ontiLnued
against, the trustees. There is no provision in tho, Code for
ILhe cnJfinuance of an action after te death of a sole plain-
tiff or2 a sole defendant, unless the cause of action survives,
aid, as this suit is based upon a cause of action whiah does
o continue after death of either par,y, there is no prlovis-
ion for its continuance.'
This casfe was taken to tho Court of Appeals, but that
court refusedl to hear the agtU ent, v,,pon ,ii, gr'ound that a
"substantial right' was not. involved. It is almost lw9.aent-
able tha., the case could not Lave been p;tised upon by i,ho.
,ighest cou'krt of the State, and especially so, when -4,1',.ro is
evidently an erroneous holding of the lower courts. The
eight of gnien., without doubt, being in favor of the de-
fendant in .hese cases.
t,'. Poach, in hip valuablo -'ork on Privat.c Corporations
(lec. lb.1), maintains that., 'The debts of a co0oration, for
which its meanbers are made liable by statute, axe such claims
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against it as arise from contract, and do not include a judg-
ment against the company for a tort, even though the tortious
aot might have been considered a breach of contract." And
in a late case in R hode Island it was held that debts con-
tracted, for which directors of a corporation are made lia-
ble, do not include damages A& daliato , or a judgment in
tor't. (Leighton v. (Oambell,$ 17 Re I. __
CONCLUSI ON.
The fundmental ideas,-- the underlying principles,--
to be t deduced from the foregoing discourse may be entu-
erated as follows :-
1. A corporation is dead only when its legal existence
is terinated.
2. A corporation can never be dissolved so as to de-
feat the just rights of creditors.
C. The assets and capital stock for'm a fuid for the
benefit of creditors primarily, 9.nd the stockholders second-
arily.
<:. Persons having clains against a corporation on
grounds of tort ai'e not creditoys until their, clail.3- are in
judgment,, and +,hc -  darna .es ac~sc Lired -- decisqi ns ',o tho
conA.rary notwitbh t~.ing.
And, .a oneral proposition, it may lie stated that,
subject, to their poouliar or tcorporatio.'3 havt th
same protection and rights, and are held 1to the same liabili-
1Y P.nd responsibility, as are natural persons, under the same
circnstances and in the sane. iituatio:..
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